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Abstract
In the last decade measuring a company’s performance exclusively financially has been heavily
criticised. Consequently, different performance measurement systems including the Balanced
Scorecard, the Performance Pyramid, and the Quantum Performance were developed, discussed
and implemented in industry. Besides the financial perspective, additional perspectives (e.g.
customers, processes, employees, etc.) have been considered.
Organisational performance is assumed to be a multidimensional phenomenon today. Hence one
important aspect of the discussion of several concepts of performance measurement has been
the selection of the right measures.
Our paper focuses on the problem of measuring multidimensional organisational performance.
Based on the multitask agency theory we enhanced the approaches of Holmstrom/Milgrom and
Austin by introducing extrinsic and intrinsic motivation, cost of measurement and uncertainty of
measurement into the model.
The resulting formal model suggests that it is important for the selection of measures whether
the agent is motivated predominantly extrinsically or predominantly intrinsically. Again the
selection of measures depends on cost of measurement as well as the uncertainty of the
measures.
Our model suggests: it will be more easy to create a comprehensive performance measurement
system to measure multidimensional organisational performance the more intrinsically the agent
is motivated. Besides with lower (higher) cost of measurement and with lower (higher)
uncertainty of measurement more (less) dimensions of organisational performance will be
covered. Both effects mutually boost each other.
The paper concludes with two axioms of the selection of measures and a discussion of
limitations.
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1 Introduction
Today many firms as well as public institutions and governmental organisations are faced with
the problem to measure their organisational performance. Organisational performance is defined
as the ability of organisations to reach goals and hence fulfil expectations of stakeholders
(Milgrom & Roberts 1992, p. 22). As these goals and expectations are complex, organisational
performance is a multidimensional phenomenon. In this context several concepts of perform-
ance measurement, e. g. the Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan & Norton 1996) or the Performance
Pyramid (Lynch & Cross 1995) were developed and particularly the Balanced Scorecard enjoys
a wide practical acceptance (e. g. Frigo & Krumwiede 1999a, p. 1; Frigo & Krumwiede 1999b,
p. 43; Towers Perrin (1996), pp. 1f.; Ittner & Larcker 1998a, p. 222).
Many authors have discussed the problem of selecting the right measures for organisational per-
formance. The spectrum of comments ranges from “you measure the most important things”
(Thor 1994, p. 8) to the demand that “the measures are easy to obtain” (Morgan 1998, p. 11).
This paper addresses the problem of selecting adequate measures to observe organisational per-
formance from an analytical point of view. For this purpose a formal model based on the multi-
task principal-agent theory that covers several aspects of the selection of measures will be de-
veloped. Existing models are analysed and developed further as extrinsic and intrinsic motiva-
tion, cost of measurement and uncertainty of measurement are integrated. Conceptual and
managerial implications of the resulting model which might support the improvement of per-
formance measurement systems will be discussed.
2 Structure of the Problem
We will base our model on the multitask principal-agent theory, one of the most important en-
hancements of agency theory. In general, one principal (e. g. manager) and one agent (e. g. em-
ployee) act in multitask models. Karmann showed that under certain conditions multi-agent ap-
proaches could be reduced to single-agent multitask models (Karmann 1994). As opposed to
other agency approaches, the agent performs several tasks (e. g. innovation to improve the
product, service to make the product more convenient) on behalf of the principal that are all es-
sential for the final product of the organisation.
The tasks are partially substitutable; hence production is useless if the agent provides no effort
for one task at all. Finally the agent’s discomfort (work pain) is determined by his total effort
for all tasks (Holmstrom & Milgrom 1991). A general overview on multitask agency problems
is provided by Dewatripont et al. (Dewatripont et al. 2000).
The product is bought by a customer who pays the principal, whereas the price depends on the
agent’s effort intensities for the tasks. Therefore, the principal tries to influence the agent’s ef-
fort by monitoring and rewarding him. For simplification the number of tasks is limited to two
in any of the models discussed here.
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3 Literature Review
Several models that mutually agree on these fundamentals can be found in the literature (e. g.
Holmstrom & Milgrom 1991; Austin 1996; Bardsley 2001; Chambers & Quiggin 1996; Preyra
& Pink 2001; Luporini & Parigi 1996; Lal & Srinivasan 1993; Gersbach 1998; Slade 1996).
Two of them which correspond to our underlying problem of measuring organisational
performance will be reviewed in detail as we create our own model on their basis.
3.1 Holmstrom & Milgrom
One of the first multitask principal-agent models was created by Holmstrom & Milgrom (e. g.
Holmstrom & Milgrom 1991). They assumed that the agent can be motivated extrinsically only,
hence the principal can increase the effort that the agent provides with a performance-based
compensation. On the other hand the agent provides a basic effort even if he does not receive
any performance based compensation.
Two cases have to be considered:
• The principal can measure the effort that the agent spends for both tasks.
• The principal can measure the agent’s effort for one of the two tasks only.
If the principal monitors both tasks, any total effort combination can be realised. Hence the
first-best optimum can be reached.
In the second case, the principal can provide an extrinsic incentive to the agent for one dimen-
sion at best. Holmstrom and Milgrom argue that the optimal effort mix cannot be realised,
hence productivity declines and the principal deteriorates with partial supervision. Hence the
principal reaches his second-best optimum if he refrains from any supervision at all.
Holmstrom and Milgrom recommended avoiding measuring and rewarding organisational per-
formance if there is at least a single performance dimension where performance cannot be ob-
served. This tends to be true for almost any real life situation. Hence the model leads to the sug-
gestion to refrain from measuring organisational performance at all.
3.2 Austin
Further development was performed by Austin (Austin 1996) who introduced intrinsic motiva-
tion into his approach. He assumed an agent who is motivated both extrinsically and intrinsic-
ally, i. e. the agent is eager for money but also wants to make the customer happy.
As in the Holmstrom & Milgrom approach two cases have to be considered:
• The principal can measure the agent’s effort for both tasks.
• The principal can measure the agent’s effort for one of the two tasks only.
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In the first case the first-best optimum can be realised by full supervision. This result is congru-
ent to the Holmstrom & Milgrom model.
A completely different finding is derived from the second case. If the principal offers an in-
centive for an effort in the measurable dimension, under certain conditions the agent will not
reduce his effort for the immeasurable task by the same amount. Hence the agent’s total effort
supply increases and, contrary to the Holmstrom & Milgrom model, the principal might im-
prove with partial supervision. This is the second best solution.
In contrast to Holmstrom & Milgrom’s conclusions Austin suggested to measure and reward
organisational performance even if there is a performance dimension where performance cannot
be observed. Hence Austin’s model supports the practical use of multidimensional performance
measurement systems (e. g. the Balanced Scorecard).
4 The Model
The models of Holmstrom & Milgrom as well as Austin will be advanced by formally intro-
ducing cost and uncertainty of measurements. We will develop our model using a step-by-step
procedure whereas we restrict ourselves to two tasks to apply illustrative figures. First the basics
of the model will be discussed.
4.1 Basic Model
Setup
An agent, a principal, and a customer act in our model’s economy.
The agent provides effort for dimension 1x  and 2x  (e. g. innovation and service) by allocating
his total effort x  to 1x  and 2x , hence 21 xxx += . Furthermore the agent’s total effort capacity
is limited to x . The agent dislikes work, but if the principal hires him (and pays a fixed wage)
the agent will provide a basic effort “just not to be bored”. We will use a continuous and con-
tinuously differentiable cost function ( ) 0≥Xc  to express the agent’s resentment to work. The
agent is indifferent concerning the allocation of his effort, hence ( ) ( )’,’, 2121
’’ 2121
xxcxxc
xxxx
=∀
+=+
.
Hence, the agent does not strive for diversified work where he avoids exclusive effort for one
task. For a certain total effort x

 the cost function vanishes: ( )( ) xxxxxXc =+== 2121 :0, . In
addition the only local and global minimum of the agent’s cost function is at x

 and the cost
function is convex 



> 0
2
2
dx
cd
. Hence the function covers the increase of the agent’s utility with
an increase of effort to a certain level as discussed by Kreps (Kreps 1997, p. 361). Beyond x

 an
effort increase can be induced by supplying compensation to the agent.
The customer evaluates the usefulness of the agent’s effort mix. This will be considered by a
convex and monotonous set of preferences ( )( )21 , xxXz = . Hence the customer prefers equal
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effort combinations (e. g. ( )xxX ⋅⋅= ½,½ ) compared to extreme combinations, e. g.
( )xX ,0= .
The principal obtains payment ( )zg  from the customer that depends on customer satisfaction.
Therefore, the principal’s income finally depends on the agent’s effort. The principal pays the
agent to induce him to work.
Both principal and agent can observe the customer’s preferences.
Behaviour
From the principal’s point of view an optimal allocation ( )21, xx   of a certain total effort level x
results, with ( ) ( )( ) xxxxxzgxx
xx
=+ 2121
,
21  s.t. ,max:,
21
 .
Based on the optimal allocation of a certain total effort a best-mix path can be calculated, that
includes the optimal allocation of any level of total effort:
(1) ( ) ( )( ) xxxxxzgxxX
xxx
=+∀= 2121
,
21 s.t.,max:,
21
 .
Within a graphical solution (see Fig. 1) the best-mix path is determined as a set of tangent
points for any total effort level and the customer’s indifference curves.
best-mix pathcustomer’s indifference curves
levels of agent’s effort supply
2x
1x
X
Fig. 1: Example of a best-mix path
If the principal pays no performance-based salary the agent will supply a basic effort only. As in
the basic model the agent is extrinsically motivated only, hence, the cost function covers any
source of motivation. Therefore, the agent will provide a total basic effort x̂  that is at the
agent’s cost minimum: xx
=ˆ . We will refer to this case as non-supervision as the principal does
not observe and reward the agent’s effort.
The principal can induce the agent to increase his effort by offering a performance based
monetary compensation. To this end, instead of a fixed salary the principal uses an “all-or-
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nothing” contract that offers a salary if and only if the agent realises a certain effort level
( )21 ~,~~ xxX = . The agent will comply, as otherwise he would have no income. We will refer to
this as supervision.
The extent of the principal’s budget used for compensating the agent (by a fixed or a perform-
ance-based salary) is β . Consistent to Holmstrom/Milgrom and Austin we consider the budget
to be exogenously fixed. Hence the principal’s budget for compensating the agent does not
depend on the agent’s effort. As our paper deals with the selection of measures within a
performance measurement system the motivational effects of an increase or decrease of the
overall compensation are not relevant.
4.2 Introducing Permanent Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation
In the Austin model the agent is intrinsically motivated by customer satisfaction when providing
an effort above the basic effort while he is not intrinsically motivated when selecting his basic
effort. To create a consistent model we will assume that the agent is intrinsically motivated in
both cases.
To include intrinsic motivation, a monotonous function ( )zf  will be used to describe how the
agent is motivated by customer satisfaction. Hence the agent’s general calculus considering the
extrinsic motivation through the compensation β  is
(2) ( )( ) ( ) xxxXcXzfX
X
≤++− 21s.t.max: β .
It will be used in the non-supervision case to determine the level of the agent’s basic effort x̂  as
well as in the supervision case.
Now the agent is not indifferent concerning the effort allocation in general as he prefers equal
effort for both dimensions compared to extreme (e. g. no effort for service). Note that the agent
is personally still indifferent concerning the performance of the two tasks. The result of intrinsic
motivation is that he gives additional consideration to the customer’s needs. Therefore, the
agent prefers equal effort combinations compared to extreme combinations in congruence with
the customer’s preferences. If the agent is not intrinsically motivated at all, as in the Holmstrom
& Milgrom-model, then ( ) 0=zf .
According to (2), the necessary condition for the optimal basic effort (i. e. non-supervision,
hence a fixed salary is paid) results:
(3)
( ) ( )( )( )
0
2,1
=
∂
+−∂∀
=
i
i x
XcXzf β
.
We will not examine the sufficient condition in detail here. Because of their specification the
cost and utility functions possess maxima only.
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4.3 Cost of Measurement
Until now information is free in the model. After the preceding discussion that resulted in a
consistent basic model cost of measurement will be introduced.
The principal has to measure the agent’s performance to provide a performance-based com-
pensation to the agent. The Holmstrom & Milgrom model does not consider the principal’s cost
to measure the agent’s effort of a particular effort dimension at all. Austin postulates that a non-
observable effort dimension be characterised by high cost of measurement (Austin 1996, pp.
66ff.). On the other hand, his model does not explicitly consider cost of measurement. Baker
(Baker 2000) investigated how much an organisation should pay to develop better performance
measures.
Subsequently we will take nonrecurring cost 
1x
m  (resp. 
2x
m ) into account that is incurred when
the principal measures effort for task 1x  (resp. 2x ). Hence a completely non-observable meas-
ure is characterised by cost of measurement that approaches infinity.
Integrating cost of measurement the principal’s general calculus is:
(4) ( )( ) β−−−
21
max xx
X
mmXzg .
As opposed to the Austin model were one effort dimension was assumed to be not observable at
all (infinite cost of measurement for that dimension) in our model the principal can potentially
observe any effort dimension. If he exercises this privilege and observes the effort dimension 1x
(resp. 2x ) the corresponding cost of measurement 1xm  (resp. 2xm ) has to be included in his cal-
culus.
Full supervision
Full supervision occurs when the principal observes and rewards both effort dimensions. By
using an “all-or-nothing” contract the principal demands X
~
 and, therefore, has to include both
1x
m  and 
2x
m  in his calculus. As stated in section 4.1, the principal will not increase his budget
for compensation but no longer offers a fixed compensation and spends the entire budget β  for
the “all-or-nothing” contract. Hence the principal can improve his income with the bonus if
(5) ( )( ) ββ −

 

>−−− XzgmmXzg xx
̂~
21
.
To maximise his income that directly results from customer satisfaction the principal will de-
mand effort combinations on the best-mix path described by (1). Additionally (5) shows that, if
cost of measurement of at least one effort dimension is too high the principal cannot improve
with full supervision compared to the non-supervision case.
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Partial supervision
If the principal has to refrain from fully supervising the agent he still may increase his income
by an “all-or-nothing” contract for one selected effort dimension, even if the agent’s effort com-
bination will not be on the best-mix path.
For a more comprehensive presentation we will assume the principal to offer an “all-or-
nothing” bonus for the effort dimension 1x . Hence there will be no performance-based com-
pensation for 2x . Now the agent can only optimise his effort for the “free” effort dimension 2x .
The agent’s calculus (2) applies, while the level of 1x  is predetermined:
(6) ( )( ) ( ) xxxXcXzfX
x
≤++− 21s.t.max:
2
β
The necessary condition for the optimal effort from the agent’s point of view according to (6) is
(7)
( )( ) ( )
0
22
=
∂
∂−
∂
∂
x
Xc
x
Xzf
.
Again the sufficient condition will not be examined in detail.
If the principal will apply partial supervision by offering an “all-or-nothing” contract for effort
dimension 1x  (demanding 1
~x ), cost of measurement 
1x
m  are incurred. The principal will im-
prove by partial supervision compared to non-supervision if
(8) ( )( ) ββ −

 

>−− XzgmXzg x
̂~
1
.
4.4 Uncertainty of Measurement
So far we assumed the values measured by the principal for 1x  and 2x  to be certain. Now inac-
curacy of measurement will be integrated into the model by random variables 1x  and 2x , re-
spectively, that represent the measured values of 1x  and 2x , respectively. 1x  and 2x  are inde-
pendent, normally distributed with mean 1x  and 2x , respectively, and variance 
2
1x
σ  and 2
2x
σ ,
respectively.
The stochastic element of our model is different from that of the Holmstrom & Milgrom model.
While Holmstrom & Milgrom regarded the product that is generated by the agent to be deter-
mined by the agent’s effort and a random influence simultaneously, we will assume that the
product depends on the agent’s effort only, but the perceived values of the agent’s effort to be a
random variable. Hence the values of the agent’s effort that the principal observes are random
variables. Consequently, other variables like the customer satisfaction z  that results from the
customer’s perception of the agent’s effort and the principal’s return g  become random vari-
ables, too. Principal and agent also differ in their risk attitude as will be discussed in detail now.
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Setup
Here we assume the customer as well as the agent to be risk neutral. The customer’s utility
function is defined by ( ) yyuK = , and that of the agent by ( ) yyuA = . Both functions have an
Arrow-Pratt value of absolute risk aversion 0== AK rr  (Arrow 1970, pp. 90). The principal is
risk averse. His utility function can be described by a Bernoulli utility function with
( ) yP eyu −−= 1  where 
( )
( ) 1
2
2
=−=
dy
ydu
dy
yud
r
P
P
P .
Behaviour
The principal no longer optimises his income but the utility that derives from his income. Hence
the principal’s general calculus is
( )( )( )β−−−
21
21
21
,
,max xxP
xx
mmzgu xx .
According to the Bernoulli principal the expected utility ( )( )( )( )β−−−
2121
, xxP mmzguE xx
and not the expected value ( )( )( )β−−−
2121
, xx mmzgE xx  is the decision variable.
This expected utility criterion can be transformed into an equivalent µ -σ -criterion with the
following µ -σ -objective function:
(9) ( ) 2
2
1
yy σ⋅−= Ev  where ( )( ) β−−−= 2121 , xx mmzg xxy .
Hence the principal’s general calculus is
(10) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( )ββ −−−⋅−−−−
2121
21
,var
2
1
,max
,
xxxx
xx
mmzgmmzgE 2121 xxxx .
The customer’s and the agent’s calculi do not change as terms until equation (3) are still valid.
Hence the non-supervision case is not affected by the stochastic component.
Similar to (5) the principal can improve by full supervision if
(11) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( ) βββ −

 



>−−−⋅−−−− XzgmmzgmmzgE xxxx
̂,var
2
1
,
2121 2121
xxxx .
The condition for partial supervision corresponding to (8) is
(12) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( ) βββ −

 



>−−⋅−−− XzgmxzgmxzgE xx
̂,var
2
1
,
11 2121
xx .
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4.5 Calibration
Until now our model has not been specified in great detail. Hence the results of the discussion
are not very specific. We will now assume more explicit functions to derive a more detailed un-
derstanding of the selection of measures to quantify organisational performance. The calibration
is necessary, as otherwise there would be no explicit solution of several equations. It will also
be helpful to provide a graphical interpretation of the selection of measures.
4.5.1 Functional Assumptions and Basic Model
Customer satisfaction will be represented by ( ) 21 xxXz ⋅= . Using a Lagrange function the best-
mix path ( ) xxxXzX
x
=+∀ 21 s.t. max:  can be calculated accordingly: 21 xx = .
To consider the agent’s intrinsic motivation here we will use ( ) zazf ⋅= , where a  describes
how strong the agent’s decisions are influenced by customer satisfaction. The agent should not
dislike customer satisfaction and he should not be overly philanthropic either, hence 10 ≤≤ a .
In addition the agent is characterised by a polynomial cost function ( ) ( )221 dxxXc −+= . We
assume there should be a certain x

 with ( ) 0=xc  , hence 0≥d . The level of effort the agent
will provide by any means is described by d .
A linear function ( )zg  will be used to describe how much of the customer’s benefit the prin-
cipal skims. Subsequently we assume ( ) zbzg ⋅=  with 10 ≤≤ b . Therefore b  describes the
price level for the product that principal and agent produce.
4.5.2 Introducing Permanent Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation
Considering the calibration (3) can be substantiated:
( )( )( )
0
2
2121
2,1
=
∂
+−+−⋅⋅∂∀
=
i
i x
dxxxxa β
, thus
(3a)
( )( )( ) ( ) 02 212
1
2
2121 =−+⋅−⋅=
∂
+−+−⋅⋅∂
dxxxa
x
dxxxxa β
, and
(3b)
( )( )( ) ( ) 02 211
2
2
2121 =−+⋅−⋅=
∂
+−+−⋅⋅∂
dxxxa
x
dxxxxa β
.
By equating (3a) and (3b) we obtain 21 xx = . From utilising this identity in (3a) or (3b)
4
2
21 −
⋅−==
a
d
xx  results. As the cost minimal effort that results from the cost function ( )Xc  is
dxxx =+= 21

, the agent’s basic effort 




−
⋅−
−
⋅−=
4
2
,
4
2ˆ
a
d
a
d
X  exceeds his cost minimal effort
for 10 ≤≤ a . Hence an additional intrinsic motivation results in a higher basic effort while the
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budget β  the principal spends for extrinsically motivating the agent does not influence the ba-
sic effort level.
4.5.3 Cost of Measurement
Following the structure of chapter 4.3 we will discuss the specification of our model in the full
and partial supervised case separately.
Full supervision
Using the optimal basic effort 




−
⋅−
−
⋅−=
4
2
,
4
2ˆ
a
d
a
d
X
  that resulted from the calibrated model,
equation (5) can be specified as the principal’s general calculus with full supervision. Accord-
ingly, the principal can improve by granting a performance based bonus to the agent, if
(5a) ( ) ββ −−
⋅⋅>−−−⋅⋅ 2
2
21
4
4~~
21 a
d
bmmxxb xx .
Because 21 xx =  applies for the best-mix path
( ) ( )2
2
2
4
41~
21 −
⋅>+⋅−
a
d
mmbx xxi , and
(5b) ( ) ( )21
1
4
4~
2
2
xxi mmba
d
x +⋅+
−
⋅>
result. If cost of measurement disappear for both effort dimensions, the principal can improve
with every ( )21 ~,~~ xxX =  at the best-mix path beyond the basic effort x̂ . As the principal’s in-
come raises with increasing effort, the effort capacity is the limiting factor and the principal
demands 



=
2
,
2
~ xx
X  from the agent.
(5b) also shows that if cost of measurement are too high, a performance based bonus could only
improve the principal’s income if he demands effort that is beyond the agent’s effort capacity.
As the agent will not supply this effort, the principal has to refrain from full supervision if
xxx >+ 21 ~~
( ) ( ) xmmba
d
xx >+⋅+−
⋅⋅
21
1
4
4
2 2
2
( ) ( ) 



−
−⋅>+
2
22
4
4
421 a
dx
bmm xx .
Hence high cost of measurement will force the principal to refrain from full supervision. This is
also true if cost of measurement of even one dimension only is too high.
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Partial supervision
The condition for optimal effort from the agent’s point of view (7) can be substantiated in the
calibrated model:
( )
0
2
21
2
21 =
∂
−+∂−
∂
⋅⋅∂
x
dxxc
x
xxa
( ) 02 211 =−+⋅−⋅ dxxxa
(7a) 12 2
2
x
a
dx ⋅−+= .
The scope of (7a) is bounded by the optimally allocated basic effort 
4
2
ˆ1 −
⋅−=
a
d
x , i. e. the
agent’s non-supervision optimum, and the non-negativity of ix . Hence 2
2~
4
2
1 −
⋅−≤≤
−
⋅−
a
d
x
a
d
.
The lower border of the interval results in X̂  while the upper border leads to point E in Fig. 2.
For smaller 1x , equation (7a) is not reasonably defined because the basic effort is not met, for
larger 1x  the agent supplies 02 =x .
If the agent’s intrinsic motivation enhances, a  increases. According to (7a) the agent will then
provide more effort for 2x  when 1x  is determined by the “all-or-nothing” contract. Hence the
overall organisational performance can improve with an increasing intrinsic motivation of the
agent. In Fig. 2 this results in a rotation of X̂ around the intersection of X

 and the 2x -axis.
Consequently X̂  as well as points B and C will result in better organisational performance.
The principal’s opportunities for improvement by partial supervision described by (8) can be
substantiated where 1
~x  is determined by the ”all-or-nothing” bonus and 2x  is not observed by
the principal:
( ) ββ −−
⋅⋅>−−



 ⋅−+⋅⋅ 2
2
11
4
4~
2
2~
1 a
d
bmx
a
dxb x
(8a) ( ) ( ) ( ) 12
2
242
~
22
222
1 xmabaa
da
a
d
x ⋅
−⋅
+
−⋅−
⋅<




−
+ .
The solution of (8a) is:
(8b)
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 1
1
2
2
242
~
2
2
242
22
22
122
22
x
x
m
abaa
da
a
d
xm
abaa
da
a
d
⋅
−⋅
+
−⋅−
⋅+
−
−<
<⋅
−⋅
+
−⋅−
⋅−
−
−
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Eventually it has to be checked if the scope of (7a) covers the entire solution area of (8b) that is
true here.
Cost of measurement of 0
1
=xm  can be regarded as a special case because the area of valid 1~x
is extremely large with ( ) ( ) ( )42
4~
4
2
1 −⋅−
⋅<<
−
⋅−
aa
d
x
a
d
. The lower border of the interval results
in X̂  while the upper corresponds to point C in Fig. 2.
As the interval is open in the case with no cost of measurement 
1x
m  the principal can improve
his income with some 1
~x  that are marginally larger than the optimally allocated basic effort X̂ .
(8b) also shows that the principal can be worse off in the case with cost of measurement 
1x
m  if
he chooses 1
~x  too close to the optimally allocated basic effort. If ( ) ( )2
22
4221 −⋅−⋅
⋅⋅−>
aa
bda
mx  so
that the solution set of (8b) is empty, it is impossible for the principal to improve his income by
measuring and rewarding the 1x  effort. The principal’s maximum income with
( ) ( )2
22
4221 −⋅−⋅
⋅⋅−=
aa
bda
mx  and usage of the “all-or-nothing” bonus equals his income at the op-
timal allocated basic effort.
The principal will improve compared to non-supervision with any effort demand 1
~x  within the
interval of (8b). The best solution can be determined by maximising the left term of (8) subject
to (7). Hence the following criterion can be formulated:
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
22
~
s.t.
~
max
1
1 x
Xc
x
Xzf
mXzg x
x ∂
∂=
∂
∂−− β .
With the calibration
β−−



 ⋅−+⋅⋅
1
1
11~
~
2
2~max x
x
mx
a
dxb
results. The necessary condition is
0~
2
2~
2
2
11 =⋅
−⋅−



 ⋅−+⋅ xabxadb
2
~
1 −
−=
a
d
x
represented by point B in Fig. 2.
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The optimal 1
~x  is situated at the centre of the interval (8b) and is independent of the level of
cost of measurement 
1x
m . According to (7a) the agent will choose 
22
d
x =  if the principal’s
“all-or-nothing” contract sets 
2
~
1 −
−=
a
d
x .
Fig. 2 is intended to illustrate some exemplary situations. The effort capacity 10=x  is repres-
ented by X . The parameters are set to 4=d , 5.0=a , and 8.0=b . The agent’s least cost com-
binations are situated at X

. The basic effort is described by X
̂
.
Fig. 2 includes two different situations:
1. With cost of measurement ( ) ( )5,0,
21
=xx mm , the principal can increase his income com-
pared to non-supervision if he observes and rewards both effort dimensions, i. e. imple-
menting full supervision. With every effort between D and X  on the best-mix path X
the principal improves. From the principal’s point of view the optimum will be reached
at ( )5,5=X .
2. If cost of measurement are ( ) ( )100,0,
21
=xx mm  the principal cannot improve at the best-
mix path within the effort capacity as cost of measurement of dimension 2x  are too high.
Therefore, the principal will observe only one dimension and offers a performance-based
bonus for this dimension. Because of lower cost of measurement this will certainly be
1x . Every effort dimension that might be realised is situated at X̂ . Although effort com-
binations beyond the intersection of X̂  and the 1x -axis (point E in Fig. 2) can be
reached, the principal will not choose these as customer satisfaction is zero and the prin-
cipal’s utility is negative. With any effort combination between X
̂
 and C the principal
can improve his income compared to the non-supervision case. The principal obtains his
maximal income with ( ) 



= 2
3
8
21 ,, xx  at B.
Starting from cost of measurement ( ) ( )5,0,
21
=xx mm  with increasing 1xm  or 2xm , D approaches
X  and more agent effort is necessary for the principal to improve. If the sum of 
1x
m  and 
2x
m
exceeds 82.15
245
3,876 ≈ , D relocates behind X  at the best-mix path and the principal cannot im-
prove his income by fully supervising the agent at all.
When partial supervision occurs, with an increase of 
1x
m , the spread where the principal im-
proves compared to non-supervision reduces. Here the optimum B does not shift.
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1086420
2
4
6
8
10
B
C
E
D
1x
2x
X

X̂
X
X
X
X
̂
( ) ( )5,0,
21
=xx mm
( ) ( )100,0,
21
=xx mm
Agent’s least cost
combinations
Agent’s effort capacity
Best-mix path
Principle’s optimum
with full supervision
Principle’s optimum
with partial supervision
of 1x
Fig. 2: Exemplary summarisation of the model with cost of measurement
4.5.4 Uncertainty of Measurement
For the expected value in the principal’s general calculus considering the uncertainty of meas-
urement (9), (10), and (11) apply:
( ) ( )( )β−−−=
2121
, xx mmgEE xxy
( ) ( )β−−−⋅⋅=
2121 xx
mmbEE xxy
( ) ( ) β−−−⋅⋅=
2121 xx
mmEbE xxy
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) β−−−⋅+⋅⋅=
212121
,cov xx mmbEEbE xxxxy ,
and as 0),cov( 21 =xx  because of the independence of 1x  and 2x :
( ) ( ) ( ) β−−−⋅⋅=
2121 xx
mmEEbE xxy
( ) β−−−⋅⋅=
2121 xx
mmxxbE y .
The variance ( )yy var2 =σ  can be calculated as follows:
( ) ( )( )β−−−=
2121
,varvar xx mmg xxy
( ) ( )β−−−⋅⋅=
2121
varvar xx mmb xxy
( ) ( )212 varvar xxy ⋅⋅= b
and because of the independence of 1x  and 2x :
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )212211222 varvarvarvarvar xxxxxxy ⋅+⋅+⋅⋅= EEb
( ) ( )222212222 2121var xxxxy σσσσ ⋅+⋅+⋅⋅= xxb .
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Hence the principal’s µ -σ -objective function is
(9a) ( )22221222221 212121 2
1
xxxx σσσσβ ⋅+⋅+⋅⋅⋅−−−−⋅⋅= xxbmmxxbv xx .
Using the calibration, the criterion (11) when the principal improves with full supervision com-
pared to non-supervision can be substantiated:
(11a) ( )( ) ( ) βσσσσβ −

 



>⋅+⋅+⋅⋅⋅−−−− XzgxxbmmXzg xx
̂
2
1~ 2222
1
22
2
2
212121 xxxx
.
When non-supervision occurs, the agent’s basic effort 
4
2
ˆˆ 21 −
⋅−==
a
d
xx   is not affected by a
variance. Hence the level of the µ -σ -objective function is ( ) β−−
⋅⋅= 2
2
4
4
a
d
bv .
The solution of (11a) is
(11b)
( )
( )222
222
2
2
21
2121
2
1
2
1
4
4
~
xx
xx
σσ
σσ
+⋅⋅−
⋅⋅⋅+++
−
⋅⋅
>
bb
bmm
a
db
x
xx
i .
If the variance of the measured values increases so that the denominator of the root gets negat-
ive the principal cannot improve by full supervision. The same applies if the root of (11b) ex-
ceeds half of the total effort capacity, i. e. if the cost of measurement of at least one effort di-
mension or the variance of both dimensions get too large.
The calculus of the risk neutral agent is not influenced by the stochastic component. Hence the
terms from (6) up to and including (7a) hold true.
As a specification of (12) the principal can improve his income by partial supervision compared
to non-supervision if
(12a) ( )( ) βσβ −



 

>⋅⋅⋅−−− XzgxbmXzg x
̂
2
1~ 22
2
2
11 x
.
Using the functional assumptions
( ) βσβ −−
⋅⋅>⋅



 ⋅−+⋅⋅−−−



 ⋅−+⋅⋅
2
2
2
2
1
2
11
4
4
2
2
2
1
2
2
11 a
d
bx
a
dbmx
a
dxb x x
results. The solution corresponding to (8a) is
(12b)
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )2222
2222
22
22
2
22
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
2442
232
24428
42816
224
224
x
x
x
x
x
abaab
adb
abaam
aadb
aba
adbd
x
σ
σ
σ
σ
σ
⋅−⋅+−⋅−⋅−⋅
⋅−⋅⋅⋅−
−⋅+−⋅−⋅−⋅⋅−
−+−⋅⋅⋅⋅
<







⋅−⋅+−⋅−
⋅−⋅⋅⋅−⋅
− .
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Because of the complexity of (12b) we forego to transform it into an equation corresponding to
(8b). The transformation can be performed equivalent to the solution of ( ) bax <− 2  in x .
If the right term of (12b) gets negative the principal cannot increase his income by partial super-
vision. The improvement may fail because of a high variance of 1x  as well as of high cost of
measurement 
1x
m . Both effects mutually boost each other: with high cost of measurement the
critical level of the variance decreases and a high variance reduces the critical level of meas-
urement cost. This means that higher cost of measurement is justified if the variances of the
measured efforts are smaller and vice versa. The variances can be regarded as a measure for the
reliability of a performance measure that may be part of the quality of the performance meas-
urement system in general.
5 Conclusions
There are several models that make suggestions on the selection of measures to quantify organ-
isational performance. Based on the work of Holmstrom & Milgrom and Austin we developed a
formal model based on multitask principal-agent-theory that considers an extrinsically and in-
trinsically motivated agent, cost of measurement and the uncertainty of measurement.
If there are reliable measures for every performance dimension available that can be obtained at
reasonable cost, the first best solution can be realised. This is the intersection of the optimal al-
located effort (best-mix path) and the agent’s effort capacity. Hence we can formulate the first
axiom on the selection of measures to quantify organisational performance:
1. If every relevant effort dimension can be measured within an organisation at reasonable
cost and if high quality measures are available for every effort dimension, the organisa-
tion’s performance measurement system should observe and reward all effort dimen-
sions.
On the other hand the second best solution is more interesting and more relevant to real life.
The second best applies if the first best optimum is out of range because of high cost of meas-
urement or a high variance of measures of at least one performance dimension. Depending on
the level of measurement cost, measure reliability and the agent’s motivation, organisational
performance can be improved by partial supervision (i. e. observing only one performance di-
mension). If these conditions are not true the second best is non-supervision (i. e. offering no
performance based compensation and leave the agent alone). Based on the quantitative analysis
in section 4.5.4 the corresponding axiom is:
2. If at least one relevant effort dimension can be measured within an organisation at reas-
onable cost and if high quality measures are available for that effort dimension, the or-
ganisation’s performance measurement system should observe and reward that effort
dimension.
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As already noted in the introduction, the selection of measures for organisational performance is
widely discussed with suggestions to use relevant measures only or proposals to choose meas-
ures that are easy to obtain. Our model suggests that both postulates
• measure what is important for an organisation’s long-term success, and
• measure what is easily measurable
are not as diametrical than previously thought, but have to be used simultaneously to select
measures. Kiefer & Novack, 1999, p. 26 held a different view (use axiom 1 only), as did
Feltham & Xie, 1994, pp. 431ff.
The demand to use a balanced set of measurements to measure organisational performance is
widespread in the literature (Vitale & Mavrinac & Hauser 1994, p. 13; Kaplan & Atkinson
1998, p. 375 and others). While it is compatible to the first axiom, there is at least partial dis-
agreement with the second axiom. Axson’s 1999, p. 8 opinion that it is unrealistic to strive for a
balanced set of measures but to strive for tailored measures that meet an organisation’s needs
confirms the second axiom.
We found that the agent’s motivation is very important when choosing measures to quantify or-
ganisational performance.
If the agent corresponds to the average human being of McGregor’s “theory X” (McGregor
1960) that dislikes work, the manager should refrain from measuring organisational perform-
ance at all if there is at least one relevant performance dimension that cannot be measured at
reasonable cost or with reliable measures. As there will always be a performance dimension in
real life organisations that is difficult to measure, performance measurement systems such as the
Balanced Scorecard would become counter-productive.
If the agent represents an average human being that corresponds to McGregors “theory Y” i. e.
that regards work as a source of satisfaction as well as of pain to be avoided, a completely dif-
ferent suggestion on the selection of performance measures will be derived. Now managers
should not be afraid of declining overall performance if they do not have reliable measures that
are easy to obtain for every performance dimension. Even if some relevant information is not
available organisational performance might improve by using a performance measurement sys-
tem.
The model also showed that if the agent’s intrinsic motivation can be increased, organisational
performance will improve. This holds true for partial supervision as well as for non-supervision
while for full supervision the agent’s intrinsic or extrinsic motivation is irrelevant.
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Limitations
Baiman 1990, pp. 344ff. formulated three criticisms of the principal-agent theory in general:
• realism of the assumptions of principal-agent models,
• simplicity of the models analysed, and
• complexity of the results.
In the following we will analyse each of these points further.
Most of the functional assumptions we used during the development of the model are arbitrary.
Partly these assumptions simplify, e. g. specific functions for customer satisfaction ( )Xz  or
agent motivation ( )zf . Partly these assumptions affect the type of the model’s implications ex-
tensively, e. g. the principal’s, agent’s, and customer’s risk behaviour. The irrelevance of the
total amount of rewards is another assumption that is not very close to reality.
Similar to the Austin model, our model contains cases where the agent provides effort although
his total utility is negative. To eliminate this shortcoming, the cost of inducing an increase in ef-
fort has to be integrated into the model. Even under full supervision the principal might not
strive to achieve the agent’s effort capacity, as it will be too expensive. Integrating cost of in-
ducing effort increase do affect the total amount of effort spend, but do not affect the model’s
implications concerning the selection of measures. Hence we assumed the total amount of re-
wards to be constant.
Our model is a simplifying image of reality. For instance, we do not consider interactions on la-
bour, commodity and financial markets. Likewise we neglect several aspects of behavioural
theories such as trust and fairness (see similar Baiman 1990, pp. 344ff.).
Baiman’s criticism on the complexity of results of agency analysis focuses on the type of con-
tracts between principal and agent that cannot be observed in reality. Our focus was not so
much on contracts but on measures of a performance measurement system. We conclude with
two normative axioms how measures to quantify organisational performance should be selected
by demonstrating the effect of measurement cost, intrinsic and extrinsic motivation and the un-
certainty of measurement.
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